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Abstract My intention is to cast light on the characteristics of epistemic or fundamental
research (in contrast to application-oriented research). I contrast a Baconian notion of
objectivity, expressing a correspondence of the views of scientists to the facts, with a
pluralist notion, involving a critical debate between conflicting approaches. These conflicts
include substantive hypotheses or theories but extend to values as well. I claim that a
plurality of epistemic values serves to accomplish a non-Baconian form of objectivity that
is apt to preserve most of the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science. For instance,
pluralism is the only way to cope with the challenge of preference bias. Furthermore, the
plurality of epistemic values cannot be substantially reduced by exploring the empirical
success of scientific theories distinguished in light of particular such values. However, in
addition to pluralism at the level of theories and value-commitments alike, scientific
research is also characterized by a joint striving for consensus which I trace back to a
shared epistemic attitude. This attitude manifests itself, e.g., in the willingness of scientists
to subject their claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. This shared
epistemic attitude is embodied in rules adopted by the scientific community concerning
general principles of dealing with knowledge claims. My contention is that pluralism and
consensus formation can be brought into harmony by placing them at different levels of
consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of social conventions
regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific community.
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1 Introduction
My intention is to clarify the nature of scientific objectivity and of the characteristics of
epistemic research, also known as fundamental research or academic research. The
underlying motive is to illuminate the distinction between epistemic research and appli-
cation-oriented research in methodological respect. In the pertinent literature, complaints
to the effect are frequently raised that application-orientation is liable to hurt central virtues
of doing research, as they are epitomized in fundamental research (Schweber 1993; Ziman
2002, 2003). I won’t deal with such claims directly but rather with how to test them. If the
bearing of such objections is supposed to be examined, a distinction between application-
driven research and fundamental or epistemic research is called for. Yet the viability of
such a distinction is often denied. Many critics claim that application-oriented and fun-
damental research are inextricably interwoven and cannot be unraveled. I wish to under-
mine this inseparability claim by outlining essential features of fundamental or epistemic
research. I hasten to add that I want to have this distinction used for analytical purposes
only. I grant at once that a given research project in the sciences can be application-
oriented and epistemic in character at the same time (Stokes 1997, pp. 8–17, 71–75). The
distinction between applied and epistemic is meant to be non-exclusive. What I seek to
elaborate is a sort of ideal type of epistemic research that can be used to classify or
evaluate the plethora of non-ideal or mixed cases that dominate the research practice.
I claim that epistemic research in science can be reconstructed by appeal to values.
I explore the role of values in the test and confirmation procedures of science (also known
as the context of justification) and discuss the role and influence of epistemic and
non-epistemic values. The trouble with values is that they are mostly partisan and
non-universal and are thus feared to undermine the objectivity of science. I contrast a
Baconian notion of objectivity, expressing a detached stance of scientists and a corre-
spondence of their views to the facts, with a pluralist notion, involving a critical debate
between conflicting approaches. These conflicts include substantive hypotheses or theories
but extend to values as well. I argue that pluralism serves to accomplish a non-Baconian form
of objectivity that is apt to preserve most of the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science.
However, scientific research needs to be characterized by additional factors, e.g., by the
willingness to subject one’s claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. In
order to account for such features of scientific practice, appeal to shared epistemic goals is
necessary. This is where pluralism is bound to come to an end. This shared epistemic attitude
expresses a commitment to the gain of objective knowledge and is embodied in rules adopted
by the scientific community concerning the procedures of examining assumptions. These
rules do not address the evaluation of scientific hypotheses directly but rather the social
processes that govern the test and confirmation practices in the scientific community.
Controversy and strife is as characteristic of research as is unforced consensus formation. My
claim is that the two features can be brought into harmony by placing them at different levels
of consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of social conventions
regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific community.
2 Objectivity and Values
Max Weber is often credited with conceiving the notion of a value-free science. Weber
claimed that science can never enunciate binding norms or ideals. Values can be studied in
a systematic fashion, to be sure: conceptual relations between values can be analyzed, the
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consequences and side-effects of adopting certain values can be determined or the
appropriateness of means for the realization of certain ends be examined. However, science
cannot justify or disprove value judgments (Weber 1904, pp. 148–157).
Underlying this conception is a clear distinction between facts and values, based on
David Hume’s insight that values do not follow from facts: ‘is’ does not imply ‘ought’
(Hume 1739/1740, p. 469). Given this fact-value dichotomy, the idea of restricting science
to the realm of the factual expresses a commitment to objectivity. Objectivity in the
metaphysical sense means that science represents the pertinent objects and processes
truthfully; science captures the nature of these items. By contrast, objectivity in the
methodological sense means justified intersubjective agreement. All competent observers
agree on ascribing certain properties to an object; the process of assessing claims is non-
arbitrary and non-subjective (Longino 1990, pp. 62–63; 1993, p. 261). Objectivity in the
metaphysical sense is rooted in objectivity in the methodological sense: only by following
demanding examination procedures can we hope to capture the nature of objects. That is,
science is the royal road toward knowledge of the world—if anything is.
Both notions of objectivity agree in that objectivity is achieved by going beyond what is
merely subjective. Objective features are part of the phenomena and thus independent of
our wishes and fears, and of what we appreciate or detest. By contrast, value-judgments are
subjective and depend on our choice. They express individual or social commitments and
gain their binding force by agreement or convention. As a result, it is not implausible at
first sight to regard the intrusion of values as a threat to scientific objectivity.
The notion of objectivity was strongly shaped by Francis Bacon. Bacon’s notion of
objectivity emphasizes representing the phenomena adequately and being neutral to and
detached from the research object. The pertinent slogan is to relinquish one’s prejudices.
This means that researchers are advised to avoid any premature formation and one-sided
examination of hypotheses and to include alternative perspectives, potential counterex-
amples and additional influences into their considerations (Bacon 1620, Bk. I, §§ 37–65,
68). This notion of objectivity is individual-centered; it embodies the early modern ideal of
exploring questions by utilizing one’s own senses. This attitude grew out of the distrust the
pioneers of the scientific revolution harbored vis-a`-vis the science of the past. Scientists are
required to look into the matter themselves.
Baconian objectivity does not demand that research be conducted by scientists in iso-
lation. Rather, Bacon advocates the division of labor that is so characteristic of large parts
of science today. It is perfectly all right that the various features and facets of a phe-
nomenon are disclosed by a number of researchers (Bacon 1620, Bk. I, § 113). Thus,
Baconian science is a social undertaking, to be sure, but not necessarily so. Research can
be distributed among various scientists provided that they uniformly apply Bacon’s canon
and don’t let their subjective predilections or aversions enter their scientific judgments. No
particular significance is credited to the interaction among scientists. Further, all value-
commitments, at least those that transcend the epistemic obligations of Bacon’s rules of
reasoning, tend to distort the objectivity of science. This notion of objectivity resists any
integration of values apart from the appreciation of knowledge and the commitment to
Bacon’s rules.
3 The Role of Epistemic Values in Science
However, it is clear that doing research today appeals to values in a large number of ways
and respects. It has been frequently emphasized that the facts in and by themselves do not
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determine how they are to be rendered or interpreted. For instance, one way of capturing
data is to simply itemize the phenomena observed, an alternative option is to ascend to
observational generalizations, a third possibility is to subsume such generalizations under
higher-level theoretical principles. Each of these modes exhibits characteristic virtues and
liabilities. Cataloguing observations renders the facts with high accuracy and certainty,
while summarizing them by observational generalizations avoids the unwieldiness of the
first approach and yields a more parsimonious account. Invoking theoretical principles
provides a more unified and coherent picture of an entire realm of experience but suffers in
general from a reduction in accuracy. Typically, descending from the principles to the
concrete phenomena demands adjustments by adding more specific hypotheses or intro-
ducing correction factors (see Sect. 4).1
Underdetermination problems of this kind can be addressed and in part solved by
invoking values called ‘epistemic’ or ‘cognitive’ (McMullin 1983, pp. 6–8, 18–20; Carrier
2008a, pp. 274–275), a designation I take to emphasize the gain of significant knowledge
or understanding (rather than truth simpliciter, see below). Kuhn initiated this approach
with sketching a ‘list model’ for assessing scientific theories; his list of values includes
accuracy, consistency, broad scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977, pp. 321–322).
Kuhn’s list is by no means exclusive. Helen Longino suggests empirical adequacy, novelty,
ontological heterogeneity, complexity of interaction, applicability to human needs, and
decentralization of power as standards for assessing scientific theories (Longino 1995,
p. 385).2
Epistemic values play a twofold role in science. They express requirements of signifi-
cance and confirmation. Significance requirements are influential on the choice of prob-
lems and the pursuit of theories in epistemic research, confirmation requirements
contribute to assessing the bearing of evidence on theory. As to the first role, epistemic
values delineate the goals attributed to science as a knowledge-seeking enterprise. For
instance, scientists strive for knowledge that is valid in a wide domain; they appreciate
universal principles. At the same time, they rate precision highly and correspondingly hold
quantitative relations in esteem. Further, scientists search for understanding which is often
expounded in terms of the coherence of the views entertained. Knowledge may encompass
isolated pieces of information, but understanding demands relations of fit or mutual support
among the knowledge elements.
Accordingly, epistemic significance is determined by epistemic values. Such values
serve as a non-triviality condition of knowledge claims and establishes relevance relations.
A feature underlying many such evaluations is logical content or the dependence of other
parts of the system of knowledge on the item in question. For instance, since scientists aim
for broad scope, a research question that affects large-scale generalizations comes out as
1 Underdetermination is not the only route to value-ladenness. Heather Douglas (2000) has convincingly
argued that many processes of decision-making in science are interspersed with values.
2 Here are two more lists. Willard V.O. Quine and Joseph Ullian feature, among other criteria, ‘conser-
vatism’ (i.e., coherence with the background knowledge), generality (i.e., broad scope), and ‘refutability’
(i.e., empirical testability) (Quine and Ullian 1978, pp. 66–80). Peter Kosso gives a different, but related
cluster of cognitive criteria which includes, among others, ‘‘entrenchment’’ (i.e., coherence with the
background knowledge), precision, and generality (Kosso 1992, pp. 35–41). In addition to this co-existing
multiplicity, historical changes in science affect the value-commitments of the scientific community. A
disadvantage of such lists is their lack of coherence; items can be abandoned or replaced by others without
creating inconsistencies. An alternative approach to judging scientific theories is to devise more systematic
methodological theories that identify such features of excellence from a unified point of view. Examples are
Lakatosianism and Bayesianism that give a coherent account of methodological distinction and thus provide
a rationale as to why certain features and not others are to be preferred (Carrier 2008a, p. 284).
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epistemically significant. Fundamental questions are characterized by the fact that the truth
value of a large number of other propositions are affected by their resolution. This is why
examining more fundamental or more universal claims is supposed to possess epistemic
value. By contrast, establishing logically isolated propositions (such as ascertaining the
number of leaves of a given tree at a certain time) is considered pointless. But logical
content is not always a good measure of significance. For instance, accuracy is an
epistemic value and may thus be taken as an indication of significance, but tends to reduce
the scope of a generalization and thus to diminish the number of affected propositions.
Accuracy becomes relevant in the logical-content sense if the resolution of a controversial
issue is affected by the precise numbers. In such cases, the truth values of a considerable
number of other statements hinges on getting the numbers right. Yet the epistemic dis-
tinction between prediction and retrodictive and post hoc explanation cannot be captured in
terms of differences in logical content. As a result, epistemic values are the essential
yardstick of epistemic significance, and in some, but not all, cases assessments of epistemic
significance can be traced back to logical content.
Epistemic significance is employed here as a notion of objective bearing. It is not
intended to refer to psychological states and to specify what looks interesting to many
scientists. It is rather meant to indicate what appears significant to the scientific commu-
nity. This notion is epitomized in the actual choices made. The claim is that research items
that are significant in this sense tend to be picked by the scientific community.
Second, epistemic values are employed in assessing how well hypotheses are confirmed
by the available evidence. They are used for singling out acceptable hypotheses. Accep-
tance can either mean the belief that a hypothesis (or model or theory) is sufficiently
confirmed or the recognition that the hypothesis is useful for building further theoretical
considerations on it. Hypotheses need to exhibit certain virtues over and above fitting the
phenomena in order to be included in the system of knowledge. Regarding confirmation,
appeal to non-empirical values amounts to favoring certain forms of agreement with the
observations over other forms. This is revealed by the sketch of list models above. If two
accounts are empirically equivalent and one of them uses a large number of unrelated
hypotheses while the other one appeals to a few overarching principles, the commitment to
coherence (or simplicity or broad scope) favors the latter approach. Assessed in light of this
value, the evidence favors the more unifying treatment—even if the two approaches are
empirically equivalent. The scientific community resorts to such values for making a
choice between empirically indistinguishable alternatives. Scientists break the tie between
rival accounts that conform to the data to approximately the same degree by appeal to
virtues that transcend the requirement of empirical adequacy (Carrier 2011).3
On the whole, epistemic values provide measures of epistemic significance and stan-
dards of credibility that hypotheses need to satisfy in order to pass as acceptable. Such
3 John Norton advocates the view that an underdetermination thesis of this sort is self-defeating:
Demonstrable observational equivalence suggests that the two alternatives in questions are merely notational
variants of the same theory (Norton 2008, pp. 33–36). However, Norton requires in-principle empirical
equivalence whereas I take it that temporary indistinguishability (or transient underdetermination) is suf-
ficient for driving the crucial point home that theory choices are sometimes made prior to the emergence of
empirical superiority of one of the alternatives at hand. Norton’s position is based on incorporating virtues
that go beyond the conformity to experience in the notion of confirmation. Norton’s notion of confirmation
includes plausibility considerations (Norton 2008, pp. 29–32). I grant at once that it can hardly be dem-
onstrated that to each theory an alternative can be constructed that is genuinely distinct conceptually,
provably equivalent empirically, and equally plausible. The argument employed here works with a much
weaker notion of empirical equivalence. The latter only requires contingent empirical indistinguishability
which needs neither to be permanent nor demonstrable nor include elements of inductive support.
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values are insufficiently characterized as being ‘truth-related’ or ‘truth-conducive’. They
may possess these properties but their distinction is to adumbrate which kind of truths we
consider worthwhile. For instance, virtues like broad scope express a preference for
overarching theoretical principles, values like accuracy exhibit a penchant toward more
limited generalizations that retain close contact with the observations. Such values point in
specific epistemic directions.
Critical as epistemic values are in the process of confirming and adopting hypotheses,
they fail to direct this process unambiguously. Kuhn was the first to call attention to this
insufficiency of epistemic values which arises from the tension between different such
values in their application to concrete cases (Kuhn 1977, pp. 322–325). Here is an example
of this ‘Kuhn-underdetermination’, as I call this room for judgment created by ambiguous
epistemic values (Carrier 2006, pp. 98–107; 2008a, pp. 276–278). Consider the competi-
tion between Hendrik Lorentz’s classical electron theory and Albert Einstein’s special
relativity theory around 1910. Lorentz’s theory had a larger domain of application than
Einstein’s. It included electrodynamic phenomena that were accounted for by Einstein as
well, but also interactions between charges and fields (such as the normal Zeeman effect,
i.e., the split of spectral lines in a magnetic field) that were later incorporated into quantum
mechanics. Special relativity excelled in explanatory power (or ‘simplicity’ or ‘parsi-
mony’) in the sense that a few principles covered a wide range of phenomena. The reason
is that Lorentz assumed certain effects and subsequently introduced mechanisms that
prevented the observability of these effects. He needed to invoke a sort of conspiracy of
nature who veils her true workings to the meddlesome gaze of humans. Einstein did away
with both the effects and their compensation so that special relativity outperformed clas-
sical electron theory with respect to explanatory power. Invoking the virtues of broad scope
and explanatory power leaves us without a clear rank-order of the two theories in question
(Carrier 2008a, pp. 281–282).
The underdetermination of judgment is even more striking if a conflicting set of
epistemic values is employed. Consider the tension between coherence and progress. One
may either appreciate the preservation of what has been achieved before as a primary goal or
chiefly emphasize venturing into new ground. For instance, the general relativistic program
of geometrizing gravitation involved a rupture with the Newtonian view on gravity and
shifted gravity away from the other natural forces. Gravitation adopted a unique position as
a geometrized interaction. There was a loss of coherence but a gain in empirical adequacy
and predictive power. As a result, different sets of epistemic values suggest different
judgments about confirmation when the merits of particular theories are to be compared.
4 The Non-Empirical Nature of Epistemic Values
I suggested in Sect. 3 that epistemic values are non-empirical. I wish to defend this
contention more systematically and argue that at least the fundamental epistemic values are
inevitably non-empirical and cannot be buttressed by considering how well scientific
theories that incorporate such values are doing in empirical respect. It is true, some such
values can be assessed by appeal to the empirical success of theories that appear distin-
guished in their light. Sometimes we learn by interacting with nature which values can be
upheld and which measures are called for to implement them. A well-known example is
the discovery of the placebo-effect and the subsequent introduction of the methodological
requirement of supplementing experimental subjects with a control group and do the tests
in a double-blind manner (Laudan 1984, pp. 38–39). Such methodological considerations
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derive from applying more basic epistemic values such as well-testedness to particular
empirical arrays. Further, certain values have turned out not to be realizable, which
undermines their binding force. For instance, one of the traditional criteria of knowledge is
certainty. Aristotle demands of knowledge that it is true and that we know it is true—i.e.,
that we can be certain about it. This epistemic commitment was preserved in the Scientific
Revolution; it materialized in Galileo’s predilection for thought experiments, in the
emphasis of the mechanical philosophy on intelligibility with the accent placed on push-
and-shove causation and the mechanical clock as the symbol of nature’s workings, and in
the Newtonian notion of ‘proof by experience’ (Laudan 1984, p. 61; McMullin 2001,
pp. 288–289, 295–299). Science was not only required to clarify how nature operates; it
was also expected to demonstrate that nature could not operate otherwise. However, the
existence of deep ruptures in the course of scientific development and the non-cumulative
nature of scientific change in periods of drastic alteration have revealed that scientific
knowledge is and remains fallible and that certainty is unachievable as an epistemic goal.
In particular, the relativity and quantum revolutions in physics early in the twentieth
century have promoted the adoption of thoroughgoing revisability.
Accordingly, in the course of the continual interaction with nature, certain epistemic
values were recognized as unrealizable and consequently abandoned. Unattainability of an
epistemic value is an experience-based argument for discounting the value (Laudan 1984,
pp. 38–40, 50–62). The question is how much weight this experience-based strategy of
judging the appropriateness of values can carry. Ste´phanie Ruphy has generalized this idea
and claimed that the epistemic worth of values in science can always be assessed on
empirical grounds. What counts as an appropriate cognitive value is decided by examining
the empirical success of theories approved in their light (Ruphy 2006, pp. 210, 212). The
trouble with this suggestion is that epistemic values contribute to defining the notion of
empirical success in the first place. Let me explain three alternative epistemic commit-
ments that regard different modes of agreement with the phenomena as empirical success.
Consider the methodological transition from inductivism to hypothetico-deductivism.
Bacon constrained science to observables, and demanded that hypothesis formation needs
to be guided by observation (Bacon 1620, Bk. I, §§ 18–19, 22, 26, 36). In the nineteenth
century, scientists and philosophers of science increasingly realized that their theories
did not fit into this inductivist framework. For instance, both the competing wave and
particle accounts in optics employed concepts (such as light wave or light particle) that
did not correspond to direct observation. As a result, the methodological commitment of
the scientific community switched to hypothetico-deductivism, in whose framework it
was legitimate to posit theoretical hypotheses which gained their justification from the
accord of their consequences with observation (Laudan 1984, pp. 56–60). Yet the in-
ductivist commitment to unmediated and complete testability had not been proven
infeasible. Rather, the scientific community had decided to settle on theories exhibiting a
higher explanatory power—which demanded concepts that were more detached from
the phenomena and were able for this reason to cover several, prima-facie distinct
phenomena.
This example shows that the adoption of epistemic values may involve a comparative
evaluation of conflicting goals. The scientific community could have held fast to its prior
inductivist orientation and sacrificed the theoretical hypotheses in question. This would
have meant denying that the explanation of phenomena accomplished by such hypotheses
count as empirical success. One could have argued within the inductivist framework that
the means used for arriving at the pertinent explanatory achievements are not viable.
Suppositions about light particles or light waves would have been taken to be purely
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speculative and not to be produced in line with the received methodological canon of
unprejudiced observation and careful generalization. It is the notion of empirical success
itself that is contentious in this case.
The same conclusion accrues from another example, namely, the issue whether experi-
mentation is a legitimate means for gaining knowledge. The legitimacy of experimentation
was introduced by the Scientific Revolution as a methodological novelty in contrast to
medieval Aristotelianism. Within the latter framework, experimental intervention was
regarded as a distortion of the natural course of events and seemed unsuitable for this reason to
elucidate the phenomena of nature. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s criticism of Newtonian
optics proceeded along the same lines. Goethe reproached Newton’s experiments for forcing
nature to respond in contrived ways so that scientists are misled in their interpretation.
Experimentation is tantamount to torturing nature with the result that she gives deceptive
answers. In order to obtain significant and trustworthy evidence about nature, she must be
allowed to speak unconstrained. Put more concretely, scientists should limit themselves to
registering what nature produces on her own; intervening in nature produces only specious
and deceptive results.4 Again, it is the notion of empirical success that is under dispute.
Third, there is, in general, a trade-off between universality and accuracy. It is true,
universal theories may provide accurate predictions (such as in the celebrated case of the
ultra-precise prediction of the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron by quantum
electrodynamics), but the more frequent relation is that the universality of a generalization
is purchased at the expense of reduced accuracy. Several strategies are possible for coping
with this predicament which involve a commitment to conflicting epistemic values. The
first strategy might be called ‘Platonic’; it consists of emphasizing universal features while
disregarding individual deviations as insignificant. What matters are the essential char-
acteristics of nature, not the accidental fluctuations, and the former are distinguished by
their universality. So lack of precision is accepted because it is deemed immaterial to the
proper notion of empirical success, namely, discovery of the comprehensive traits that
underlie the whole of nature. By contrast, an alternative approach is occasionally con-
nected with Aristotelianism. Aristotelianism in this sense (as suggested by the Categories,
see Carrier 2010, p. 168, 183) emphasizes the epistemic value of accuracy and underscores
the differences among processes and entities of the same kind. Particulars are granted
prime importance, and universals are considered as classes of particulars all of which differ
from one another on close inspection. Generalizations are of instrumental value only. They
fail to uncover the essence of the phenomena which rather lies in their uniqueness and their
richness in detail. Stretched to its extremes, an Aristotelian approach in this sense would
welcome tailor-made models for each specific phenomenon. As a consequence, such an
approach would not accept sweeping Platonic generalizations as empirical success in the
first place. By contrast, Aristotelianism would be prepared to adopt, say, the use of ten
hypotheses for explaining ten phenomena, each of the former covering one of the latter,
whereas Platonism in the sense considered here would refuse to accept any such account as
empirical success (Carrier 2011, pp. 199–201).
There are many approaches that attempt to strike a balance between these two extremes.
The approach usually employed in science, for instance, appeals to generalizations or
universal features in order to construct the conceptual backbone of the models used for
explaining the phenomena. But matching the data requires including specifics of the
4 Carrier (1981). It worth noting in passing that Goethe in his actual exposition of his anti-Newtonian color




situation at hand as well. As a result, observational regularities without theoretical foun-
dation or pragmatic moves like plugging in unexplained corrections and piecing together
incongruous parts are current in constructing models. It is only by means of such local
adaptations that the models become empirically adequate. Yet they continue to be con-
ceptually shaped by higher-order theories (Carrier and Finzer 2010, pp. 88–90).
The upshot of considering three disparate approaches to seeking knowledge is that we are
the ones who make a choice of the kind of knowledge we prefer. There is room for coping
with experience by resorting to accounts of different kinds that implement different sorts of
epistemic values. As a result, it is up to us to enrich the notion of empirical success beyond
agreement with the evidence. This is achieved by adopting epistemic values that, conse-
quently, serve to define what empirical success is all about. For this reason, the suitability of
epistemic values cannot be judged by examining the empirical success of theories that
implement these values. Adhering to some such values is tantamount to denying that
instances of empirical success, as claimed by advocates of a rival set of values, can be
regarded as empirical success in the first place. Appeal to experience in the issue of what
legitimately counts as empirical success is circular or begs the question. Epistemic values are
non-empirical or superempirical; they go beyond experience and cannot in general be based
on experience alone. This is why scientific measures of success cannot be purely empirical,
not even in the long run (in contrast to Solomon 2001, pp. 15–17, 33, 117).
5 Value-Ladenness in Science
These considerations show that epistemic values figure prominently in science. More spe-
cifically, such values play an important role in the context of justification: they delineate
qualities of knowledge we consider worth accomplishing and thereby provide standards for
assessing hypotheses. Yet there may be other, non-epistemic values that advise research and
guide theory choice. Pragmatic virtues such as simplicity in the sense of easy handling or
fruitfulness in the sense of opening up seminal lines of investigation are influential in
research, too.5 A third cluster of values is utilitarian and has to do with the uses to which
knowledge is put. Technological usefulness of a theory or the prospect of economic benefit
tied to it are examples in point. The practical bearing of an account may favor its acceptance.
Yet a significant characteristic of epistemic values is their universality; they concern the
features of knowledge we consider worthwhile irrespective of the particular contexts in
which the knowledge is used. By contrast, non-epistemic values are restricted to certain
contexts. For instance, to all appearances, no utilitarian values are operative in endeavors to
unify particle physics and the theory of gravitation or attempts to reveal the nature of dark
energy. Conversely, epistemic values were lurking behind the industrial research devoted to
giant magnetoresistance (the physical effect underlying present-day computer hard disks).
The physical explanation of this effect was mostly accomplished within the research labs of
electronics companies and improved the understanding of spin–spin coupling among elec-
trons (Wilholt 2006, pp. 72–86).6 Epistemic values are the only kind of values that we take to
express universal requirements of scientific knowledge.
5 Kuhn takes such values to be on a par with epistemic values like broad scope (see Sect. 3). Yet pragmatic
virtues do not in general outline ideals of understanding.
6 As a result, I abstain from any claim about the general superiority of pure, epistemic research as compared
to application-oriented research. Rather, the achievements of the latter are able to match the outcome of the
former in epistemic respect (Carrier 2010, pp. 175–179).
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Universality of this sort is not supposed to suggest that each and every epistemic value
is upheld come what may. On the contrary, I explained before that scientific communities
may choose particular epistemic directions and opt for different such values. Similarly,
Kuhn-underdetermination entails a trade-off between different epistemic values (see Sect.
3). The point rather is that some epistemic value is supposed to underlie each and every
scientific endeavor, whereas it is widely considered acceptable that a scientific investi-
gation may proceed without any non-epistemic ambition. For instance, the debate about the
detrimental impact of the commercialization of science betrays the widely shared worry
that the search for utility might compromise the quality of scientific knowledge. Yet no
such complaints are raised when some project fails to be of practical benefit.
If values affect what is accepted as scientific knowledge, I speak of the ‘value-laden-
ness’ of science. Value-ladenness is the converse to the ‘value-impact’ of science which
refers to the influence of scientific knowledge on the plausibility or persuasiveness of
certain value judgments. An example of the latter sort was put forward by the geneticist
Luigi Cavalli-Sforza who argued that humans are a young species, comparatively speaking,
and genetically more closely related than other species like chimpanzees. This finding
makes racism or claims of ethnic superiority less than convincing. ‘Value-free science’ in
Weber’s sense entails that no value commitments follow from adopting the system of
scientific knowledge. Strictly speaking, this notion is compatible with the value-ladenness
and the value-impact of science. In the first case, ‘ought’ is taken to be influential on ‘is’; in
the latter, no entailment relation from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ is claimed but rather an effect of
science on those factual presuppositions on which the plausibility of certain value-attitudes
rest. I am concerned here with value-ladenness: values contribute to determining what is
rightly taken as a piece of scientific knowledge.
But what about non-epistemic values? Science has become an endeavor of considerable
practical relevance in the past decades with the result that utilitarian values play a huge role
in selecting research topics. Research in the natural sciences is supported by public and
private funds on the grounds that science is regarded as a major factor of economic
competitiveness. The science of today is deeply implicated in the context of application.
The role science plays outside of libraries and laboratories brings in new value-consid-
erations. As a result, non-epistemic values are clearly influential on the research agenda or
the context of discovery. But what about the context of justification? Richard Rudner has
developed an argument to the effect that non-epistemic values rightly enter the confir-
mation procedures in science. His approach was based on the two premises that assessing
hypotheses is essential to confirmation and that hypotheses are never entailed by any
available evidence. Accepting or rejecting a hypothesis in light of data always incurs an
‘inductive risk’: such decisions may produce false positives or false negatives. A high
threshold level of acceptance reduces the risk of false positives but increases the hazard of
false negatives, and vice versa. Rudner’s suggestion is that weighing the non-epistemic
consequences of these potential errors should decide about the threshold of acceptance.
This is said to imply that ethical values rightly affect theory-choice (Rudner 1953).
Let me illustrate this claim with the more recent example of judging the hypothesis that
climate change is anthropogenic. Acceptance or rejection is influenced by the pertinent
consequences of error. The relevant false positive is that we erroneously take climate
change to be of human origin with the result of superfluous investment in technology for
diminishing atmospheric greenhouse gases. The relevant false negative is that we mis-
takenly attribute climate change to causes beyond human control and thereby refrain from
taking measures. The consequences of error are unnecessary spending on sophisticated
technology, for one, and making this planet a fairly inhospitable place for humankind, for
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another. This consideration suggests lowering the threshold for accepting climate change
as being human-made.
However, as Isaac Levi pointed out in the debate ensuing on Rudner’s thesis, this
argument fails to make research appear essentially laden with ethical (or non-epistemic)
values (Levi 1960, pp. 350–351, 357). First, accepting a hypothesis is not tantamount to
acting on the basis of this hypothesis. The practical impact of research, upon which
Rudner’s argument draws, only emerges by the decision to take certain action by relying
on the relevant beliefs. Yet in general, beliefs and actions are different kinds of things: the
same set of beliefs can spawn different actions, and the same action can spring from
different beliefs. The assumption that a vaccine is not safe can either lead to a stop of
vaccination campaigns or to attempts to find an improved vaccine; conversely, the decision
to continue with such a campaign may be based on the belief that the vaccine is safe or on
the persuasion that the severity of the corresponding illness outweighs the risk of
administering an unsafe vaccine. Second, many decisions about the acceptance or rejection
of hypotheses do not have any specifiable practical import at all. Errors in identifying
brown dwarfs or in classifying Assyrian ceramics are not likely to bring any non-epistemic
consequences in their train. In such cases, hypotheses are assessed by appeal to their
epistemic achievements only.
Still, the more general point is that the assessment of hypotheses requires balancing the
risks of false positives and false negatives. Heather Douglas has emphasized that many
factors in the design of a study affect its sensitivity in detecting false positives or false
negatives, respectively. It is not solely the choice of a threshold of acceptance, but a lot of
decisions about procedures used for providing relevant materials or classifying results that
are influential on how suitable tests are to detect mistakes of either kind (Douglas 2000).
As a result, Rudner’s basic claim that finding the appropriate balance between false pos-
itives and false negatives demands the appeal to values has some force. However, only if
the relevant research has serious ramifications into the non-epistemic world or if the
relevant hypotheses are taken as a basis for certain actions, does it follow that ethical or
non-epistemic values are rightly brought to bear. Accordingly, in contrast to Rudner’s own
intentions, his argument fails to establish that non-epistemic values are in general a
legitimate part of the confirmation process in epistemic science.
Yet room for non-epistemic values in the context of justification is created by a
different, indirect argument. First, as Kathleen Okruhlik has pointed out, theory choice
grows out of theory comparison so that this choice depends upon the alternatives on
offer. Had certain alternatives not been developed and pursued in the first place, they
could not have been accepted eventually. The pursuit of theories influences the later
choice of theories with eventual effects on the system of knowledge (Okruhlik 1994,
pp. 201–203). Second, it is widely accepted that the research agenda is legitimately
affected by non-epistemic values. We rightfully select certain items of practical impor-
tance for priority research. But since setting the agenda affects the structure of the
decisions about confirmation relations that are to be made at a later point in time, non-
epistemic values used in selecting research topics cannot help but influence the adoption
of hypotheses.
Whatever importance is attached to a subtle relationship of this sort, in many relevant
cases the research done is of practical relevance and is taken as a basis of actions. In such
cases, Rudner’s argument about weighing the non-epistemic consequences of different
types of error licenses the importance of non-epistemic values in the context of
justification.
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6 The Pluralist Conception of Objectivity
These considerations suggest that scientific confirmation rightly involves epistemic values
and to some extent non-epistemic values. Values are influential on what we accept as part
of the system of knowledge. Further, the list of models sketched in Sect. 3 suggest that a
plurality of epistemic values pervade the context of justification. We are faced with a
divergent collection of epistemic values and contrasting ways of bringing a given list to
bear on theory choice (Kuhn-underdetermination, see Sect. 3). That is, instead of the
Baconian uniformity we often witness a profound pluralism on the cutting edge of sci-
entific research at all levels involved: theories, aims or values, and practical interests (if
science in the context of application is included). I take it that the latter feature is a
consequence of the former: incorporating values produces pluralism. Values tend to be
contentious so that a diversity of opinion is bound to arise when value-laden judgments are
passed. That is, the inclusion of values is in part responsible for the pursuit of conflicting
research programs, controversies, and differences in judgment.
This is why the intrusion of values can be regarded as a threat to scientific objectivity.
Value-judgments are subjective in character and cannot be ascertained by an intersubjective
procedure. I wish to suggest that this threat can be alleviated by drawing on value-pluralism.
In the Baconian framework, pluralism is a capital sin against the objectivity of science (see
Sect. 2). But in fact, pluralism is a virtue rather than a liability. The reason is that the
detached stance of Baconian objectivity is hard to adopt. When science becomes practically
relevant, expertise and non-epistemic interests and aspirations are often heavily intertwined.
Further, there is no way of singling out a preferred set of values from the conflicting lists of
epistemic (and non-epistemic) commitments referred to before (see Sect. 3). Instead, the
only way to curb the influence of specific values is counterbalancing them with diverging
values. A notion of objectivity that is apt to take advantage of such a pluralist setting is
centered on reciprocal criticism and mutual control. The Baconian maxim of relinquishing
one’s biases is abandoned; rather, different biases are supposed to keep each other in check.
This social notion of scientific objectivity was introduced by Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos
(Popper 1962, p. 112; Lakatos 1970, pp. 68–69). It focuses on the social interaction between
scientists who reciprocally censure their conflicting approaches. This ‘advocate model’
(Adam 2008, p. 245) of scientific objectivity is supported by an epistemic rationale. All
scientists take some assumptions for granted. These beliefs appear self-evident and as a
matter of course so that they are frequently not acknowledged as substantive principles in
the first place. The trouble with such unnoticed or implicit assumptions is that they go
unexamined. They are never subjected to critical scrutiny. This means that if one of these
seemingly innocuous claims should be mistaken, its falsity is hardly recognized.
Longino has stressed that predicaments of this sort can be overcome by drawing on the
critical force of scientific opponents. They will struggle to expose unfounded principles
and try their best to poke holes in one’s cherished theories. And if scientists proceed in a
false direction, there is a good chance that they are proven wrong by their more fortunate
adversaries. Scientific controversies are an appropriate instrument for revealing blind spots,
one-sided accounts and unfounded principles. Such deficiencies are best uncovered by
taking an alternative position. For this reason, pluralism is in the epistemic interest of
science; it contributes to enhancing the reliability of scientific results. In contrast to the
Baconian notion, the pluralist approach to objectivity is essentially social. It thrives on
correcting flaws by taking an opposing stance and thus demands the exchange of views and
arguments among scientists (Longino 1990, pp. 75–76, 80; 1993, p. 266; 2002, p. 132; see
Brown 2001, p. 187).
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Within this pluralist framework, the objectivity of science needs to be separated from
the objectivity of scientists. Individual scientists need not be neutral and detached. They
may be anxious to undergird or undercut some assumption in order to promote their
reputation, support some world-view or bring about technological novelties. Such diver-
gent values and goals need in no way undermine the objectivity of science. On the con-
trary, pursuing contrasting avenues and taking one another to task is such stuff as science is
made on. In the pluralist understanding of objectivity, what matters is not to free scientists
from all contentious suppositions but rather to control judgments and interests by bringing
to bear opposing judgments and interests (Carrier 2008b, pp. 222–225).
Pluralism in the adoption of theoretical principles and value-commitments is much more
widespread than often assumed. Feminist archeology has repeatedly criticized the andro-
centric perspective of traditional archeology that neglected the role of women in the prehis-
toric world. For instance, conventional wisdom distinguished between man-the-hunter and
woman-the-gatherer. Only the work of female archeologists brought to light that data sup-
porting the prehistoric hunting and warfare of women had been consistently ignored. Graves
of women with bows or swords as grave goods had been unearthed but not been recognized as
indicating the existence of women bow hunters or women warriors. It became obvious that
archeologists had unwittingly invoked a family model prevalent in their own time for inter-
preting the excavation finds, namely, the breadwinning male and the housekeeping female.
Women archeologists supplied a new perspective for making sense of the fossil remains.
I wish to make two points with this example. First, the elaboration of an alternative
approach has improved science in epistemic respect. It has contributed to uncovering
unsupported assumptions that had escaped notice before; it has prompted new questions
and suggested new lines of inquiry. The advancement of the feminist alternative has
provided a deeper and more complete understanding of the archeological evidence. Sec-
ond, this epistemic benefit was not gained by dropping a one-sided approach and replacing
it with a more neutral one. Rather, the alternative feminist approach involves a social
model or political values as well. This time it is the role model of the working couple and
of gender equality that guides theory development. We can make epistemic progress while
continuing to bring value-commitments to bear.
If one looks more closely at the state of research in various disciplines, the existence of
alternative approaches becomes salient. Conceptual alternatives are pursued in cosmology
(regarding the existence and impact of dark matter), quantum gravitation (loop quantum
gravity versus string theory), in research on cancer (cellular versus holistic accounts,
Carrier and Finzer 2010) and Alzheimer’s disease (amyloid versus tau versus prion
hypotheses, suggesting different chief culprits). Conversely, if pluralism is absent, it needs
to be fostered. If you ask research institutes sponsored by the tobacco industry about the
health risks associated with smoking, the answer will be unanimous but at best misleading.
The trouble is that these institutions share crucial assumptions. Commitments or interests
pointing in one direction need to be counteracted by contrasting commitments and inter-
ests. There are many areas in science where the fruits of pluralism are still unreaped.
7 The Epistemic Bearing of Pluralism
These considerations suggest that pluralism contributes to producing features of scientific
research that can count as promoting objectivity. The pluralist notion of objectivity allows
scientists to proceed within the framework of their favorite research program and to bring
to bear values of their own predilection. However, there are scientific studies whose
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credibility is widely taken to be impaired by a sort of bias considered inadequate or
illegitimate. Such studies are not respected as sound but regarded as deeply flawed in
methodological respect. Torsten Wilholt speaks of a ‘preference bias’, if the researchers’
preferences are unduly reflected in the outcome. Research results affected by a preference
bias are not trusted in the scientific community (Wilholt 2009, p. 92, 98).
For instance, relevant studies are designed such that their sensitivity to the question at
hand is less high than it could be. One of Wilholt’s examples concerns the examination of
health risks of bisphenol A, a substance whose biochemical effects resemble that of
estrogen, by using a strain of rat that is particularly unsusceptible to estrogen. Another such
case is taken from a clinical trial of a medical drug that involved comparing an intrave-
nously administered test drug with a control medication that was orally given and thus
poorly absorbed (Wilholt 2009, p. 93). A third example is provided by Sheldon Krimsky
and refers to a study of the risks involved in breast implants. Silicone implants had raised a
suspicion regarding associated health risks, but the relevant study examined effects of all
sorts of breast implants indiscriminately and used statistical tests that were sensitive to all
sorts of changes—although a positive health effect of breast implants had never been
claimed. As a result, any potential harm caused by silicone implants was statistically
diluted right from the start (Krimsky 2003, pp. 156–157). As Wilholt argues, such studies
involve methodological flaws or epistemic shortcomings rather than the legitimate
expression of values many happen not to share. Preference bias occurs when measures
intended to convey epistemic trust to the relevant community fail to achieve their end
(Wilholt 2009, pp. 92, 98–99).
Criticizing preference bias seems to be in conflict with a pluralist notion of objectivity.
After all, the latter encourages the adoption of diverse points of view and appears to lack
conceptual resources to rule out any particular such stance. Yet in fact, pluralism is able to
cope with this challenge. It might look promising at first sight to hark back to the epistemic
values sketched in Sect. 3. After all, they stake out what sorts of knowledge we consider worth
knowing and guide the confirmation process. Nevertheless, they fail to get us very far in issues
like the present ones, and the chief reason is Kuhn-underdetermination. The plurality and
heterogeneity of values contained in the various lists make them unfit as a basis of the
unanimous judgment of particular cases. Value pluralism extends to epistemic values; there is
no agreement as to how exactly an excellent scientific hypothesis or theory should look like.
The flaw involved in testing or adopting the mentioned hypotheses needs to be captured
differently. It rather has to do with the fact that the studies in question do not deal with the issues
they purport to address. They do not tackle the questions they pretend to answer. In the
bisphenol A case, the issue expected to be taken up was whether there is a health risk for
humans involved. This question is sidestepped by picking a particularly robust strain of rat. The
same goes for comparing intravenously administered drugs with orally given medication and
for using statistical methods less than sensitive to detecting health risks considered relevant.
The procedures used are not floppy or inappropriate in general, and this is the deeper reason
why the appeal to epistemic values in general is of no avail. The procedures are highly suitable
for revealing false positives, that is, they are good at ruling out the mistaken assumption that
health risks exist. However, the question they purport to answer is the converse one, namely, to
ascertain that false negatives are avoided. The result suggested or intimated is that no health
risks exist. The methodological flaw involved here is false advertising.
The general framework is that accepting or rejecting a hypothesis in light of data always
incurs an inductive risk: such decisions may produce false positives or false negatives, the
erroneous adoption of a mistaken assumption or the incorrect rejection of a truthful
hypothesis (see Sect. 5). Such risks often need to be traded-off against each other. There is
2560 M. Carrier
123
no general methodological rule to determine what the right balance between the two risks
is. So researchers may feel free to strike the balance in different ways. In toxicological or
pharmaceutical studies of the sort mentioned, the occurrence of health risks is examined.
The expected purpose of such studies is to make sure that no such risks are incurred by the
persons exposed to a certain substance or treated in a certain way. The expectation is that
erroneous judgments to the effect that the conditions and procedures are safe are ruled out.
In other words, the expectation is that false negatives are avoided. But due to the lack of
sensitivity to this question, the studies fail to achieve this aim; they rather rule out that such
conditions and procedures are not prematurely barred. False advertising of this sort, I take
it, underlies Wilholt’s preference bias, that is, the ‘undue’ intrusion of the researcher’s
preferences in the outcome.
Preference bias can occur unwittingly or deliberately. Scientists sometimes miss the
right questions but sometimes misdesign a study intentionally. In the cases mentioned, it is
in the interest of the sponsors of the studies not to emphasize possible health risks, and to
make the relevant conditions and procedures appear safe. In this light it is not implausible
to suspect that the responsible scientists deliberately traded on the general assumption that
the exclusion of false negatives is at issue in such studies. The suspicion is that they tacitly
designed their study in a way that was merely apt to detect false positives. If this is true, the
studies mentioned would be misleading.
Accordingly, this behavior would violate the commitment to sincerity or honesty (that
David Resnik includes in his principles of the ethics of science (Resnik 1998, p. 53)) and
involve a misrepresentation of the issues addressed. Such methodological flaws or fraud-
ulence can be corrected by pluralism. A study of the kind analyzed needs to be supple-
mented with another one addressing the issue of false negatives. In fact, given that there is
no general rule for striking a methodologically justified balance between the opposite
inductive risks, pluralism is the only means for moving toward an appropriate equilibrium.
In a similar vein, the Mertonian value of ‘disinterestedness’ can be interpreted as being
realized by the pluralism of the scientific community. Robert Merton codified a system of
‘cultural values’ that is supposed to be constitutive of the ‘ethos of science’. Values like
‘universalism’, i.e., reliance on impersonal, pre-established criteria of evaluation, or
‘communalism’, which is linked to the imperative of free and open communication, are
demanded to govern the behavior of scientists. Such values are social in that they are
supposed to be inherent to the scientific community, but they also have a clear epistemic
significance in that their adoption is assumed to promote the quest for truth or under-
standing (and thus qualify as a particular variety of epistemic values). Disinterestedness in
the Mertonian sense means that science does not prefer certain research results over others.
This is an institutional imperative, not a psychological factor; it addresses the community,
not individual researchers, who may well be motivated to produce outcome of a certain
kind (Merton 1942, p. 276). The disinterestedness of the scientific community as a whole is
epitomized by the struggle between antagonistic approaches. The community is divided
and for this reason does not express a joint preference as to what the quest at hand should
accomplish. The pertinent requirement is to keep this pluralism alive and sufficiently broad
and to strengthen it if the community tends to sink into one-sided complacency.
8 The Epistemic Attitude and the Search for Consensus
The two preceding sections are intended to establish that pluralism has something to
contribute to promoting objectivity. In Sects. 6 and 7 I argue that pluralism is able to
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account for intuitions tied to the traditional understanding of objectivity, namely, well-
testedness, undue preference bias, and disinterestedness. However, one gap remains open.
The pluralist notion of objectivity is insufficient for ascertaining on its own the objectivity
of science. Pluralism is helpful and important for advancing the epistemic ambitions of
science, but I claim it needs to be rooted in or constrained by what I want to call the
‘epistemic attitude’. This attitude amounts to accepting the goal of gaining knowledge that
is generally recognized as exhibiting relevant virtues (like the epistemic values listed
before). That is to say, the belligerent pluralism constitutive of essential parts of scientific
rationality is curbed or pacified by a joint striving for consensus. Pluralism remains
temporary and transient; it comes to an end eventually and gives way to consensus.
In particular, we regularly observe that a period of strife and confrontation is followed
by the emergence of a consensus. When the dust has settled, a convergence toward widely
shared views obtains in the scientific community. Further, this consensus is achieved
without external pressure. Some sort of internal mechanism appears to ensure that the
plurality of contrasting and heterogeneous approaches give way to a generally accepted
state of research. Uncontroversial knowledge is fairly unanimously separated from
unchartered territory. Kuhn’s normal science has placed this phenomenon of consensus
formation in the limelight. In a similar vein, Larry Laudan (1984, pp. 21–25, 42–43), Philip
Kitcher (1993, pp. 87, 344), and Harry Collins and Robert Evans (2002, pp. 240–242)
recognize this typical sequence of controversy and agreement. The emergence of unforced
assent is a typical pattern in science.
I have tried to make plausible in Sects. 6 and 7 that pluralism has important epistemic
credentials. The prospects of a particular research endeavor are mostly uncertain and
pluralism is a handy means for exploring several tacks simultaneously. But it remains to be
clarified by which process the scientific community settles on a certain hypothesis or
theory eventually. One option is that the large majority of empirical achievements and
epistemic values point in the same direction. That is, although values such as broad scope,
coherence with background knowledge, and accuracy are conceptually distinct, it may
happen that they all favor one particular account. Miriam Solomon subscribes to such a
view, according to which consensus in science is rare and without epistemic significance.
Consensus is generated by the fortuitous convergence of a variety of factors of a diverse
nature, empirical or non-empirical, cognitive or emotional, rational or social (Solomon
2001, pp. 11, 99–120). However, the eventual formation of a consensus is typical in
science and distinctive of it. The repeated well-considered intellectual withdrawal that goes
along with the emergence of a scientific consensus is a hallmark of scientific debates.
Political and religious strife tends to continue indefinitely and is only stopped by the
weariness of the fighting parties. Yet scientific controversies usually come to an end on
substantive grounds. This phenomenon of giving in deliberately is a characteristic of the
scientific enterprise by which it is distinguished from other intellectual fields.
For this very reason, general social mechanisms that are present in broader society
cannot account entirely for this feature. I grant at once that factors such as the agreement
with the wider metaphysical or sociopolitical framework or with power relations in the
scientific community favor certain views and thus encourages consensus formation. Yet
bearing in mind that such factors exert their influence in the general social arena as well,
they cannot explain the distinctive feature of the emergence of an unambiguous state of
research. So I take it that some sort of rational consideration or argument is productive
here. The mechanism at work has to do with epistemic motivations and the commitment to
the search for knowledge of a certain kind. It is this commitment that makes scientists
inclined to defer to the better argument.
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However, what are the relevant considerations like? The epistemic values of the sort
explained cannot account for the repeated occurrence of consensus. Scientists generally
agree upon the epistemic values of agreement with experience and consistency; thus they
are worried unanimously about anomalies. But when it comes to evaluating more specific
epistemic achievements, no undivided judgment is likely to emerge (see Sect. 3).
Epistemic values beyond this core set are way too diverse to make a consensus based on
their influence probable. Any consensus achieved on their basis is always due to seren-
dipity. Rather, the criteria and rules shared among scientists and suitable to produce
consensus are located at a different level of consideration; they regulate how to deal with
knowledge claims. What is widely shared in the scientific community is requirements as to
how knowledge claims should be treated. Basic standards as regards how such claims are
to be discussed in the scientific community are widely accepted. These standards, I take it,
serve to characterize the ‘epistemic attitude’.
The Mertonian values of universalism and communalism (in the sense of unrestricted
communication; see Sect. 7) are undisputed yardsticks in discussing the merits of
hypotheses in a scientific community. In a similar vein, Longino put forward procedural
standards that are intended to govern the process of critical examination in science. One of
her requirements concerns the need to take up criticism and to respond to objections
appropriately (Longino 1993, p. 267; 2002, pp. 129–130). This requirement broadens the
Popperian obligation to address anomalies and counterinstances and not to gloss over them
(Popper 1957, pp. 66–69). The epistemic spirit of science is distinguished by taking
challenges seriously and by trying to cope with them. This commitment ramifies into
accepting the revisability of convictions and thus to relinquish dogmatism. Another one of
Longino’s procedural standards is ‘equality of intellectual authority’. This community rule
is supposed to preclude personal or institutional power playing; arguments should be
appreciated independently of community hierarchies (Longino 1993, p. 267; 2002,
p. 131).7
Such procedural rules are intertwined with values, but values of a different sort, namely,
social values of the scientific community. These rules address how to deal with dissenting
views and opposing approaches and display a clear epistemic bearing. They are epistemic
values of a particular sort. Such social values of the scientific community can be expected
to be more stable than the prevalent epistemic commitments. The latter values may change
as a result of interacting with nature and of attempting to cut nature at the joints (see Sect.
4). Yet the former values distinguish preferred patterns of social interaction in examining
knowledge claims and thus remain unaffected by changes in the demands of what a good
explanation, an excellent theory, or an illuminating experiment ought to accomplish.
I do not claim that these socioepistemic values are always respected. No norm is ever
heeded without exception. Instances of premature consensus exist, that is, cases exhibiting
an overly hasty agreement accomplished by a careless or otherwise inappropriate appli-
cation of the rules of thorough examination. For instance, nineteenth century brain research
was replete with outcomes suggesting correlations between physiological quantities such
as brain weight or asymmetry between hemispheres and psychological or social features.
To present knowledge, all these correlations are spurious; they rather reproduced the
7 This rule strikes a familiar chord, namely, Ludwik Fleck’s claim that the scientific ‘thought collective’ has
a democratic structure. This means for Fleck that the assessment of assumptions is subject to the scientific
community as a whole in an open debate. Acceptance does not arise from an arcane and secretive process
hidden from the public; by contrast, each judgment is based on evidence and arguments that are in principle
accessible to everyone (Fleck 1936, pp. 114–117).
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prejudices of the period. Yet the agreement on the underlying principles and their outcome
was widely shared.8 In such cases of rash agreement, the preceding pluralist phase of
criticism and assessment was not sufficiently pronounced. Basic commitments had not
been called into question and went unexamined. This shows that the issue at stake is not
consensus simpliciter but justified intersubjective agreement. There is a pinch of norm-
ativity involved here. Science is supposed to aim at a consensus that has been gained
through painstakingly giving heed to the procedural rules of how knowledge claims should
be addressed.
Even more pronounced are individual violations of the procedural rules mentioned. Not
infrequently, scientists ignore counterarguments or counterevidence. However, the point is
that deficiencies and failures of this sort are noticed and registered within the scientific
community. They are pointed out by critics who object to the poor quality of a research
result. Such criticism reveals that the underlying value commitment is in force. It is the
benefit of the social conception of objectivity that the objectivity of science is not put in
jeopardy by occasional individual missteps. Rather, the scientific community as a whole is
the forum of judgment.
9 Conclusion
These considerations are intended to suggest three conclusions. First, pluralism does not
detract from scientific objectivity but is a means to achieving objectivity. Pluralism in
science obtains at the level of substantive theory and at the level of values guiding the
evaluation of theories. A pluralist notion of objectivity can cope with this multiplicity of
approaches and is suitable to codify epistemic notions like ‘unduly biased study’ and
‘disinterestedness’. Pluralism is a basis for passing sound epistemic judgments. However,
second, there are limits to establishing objectivity by relying on pluralist antagonism alone.
Pluralism fails to account for one of the salient features of scientific practice, namely,
consensus formation. After a period of intensive struggle, some of the warring factions end
up defeated and their approaches stop being pursued. The appeal to pluralism is unable to
account for disclaimers of this sort. If a political movement encounters opposition it will
repeat its points even more forcefully. Sometimes this is different in science, sometimes
scientists converge in their views. To explain this element of unforced persuasion or
deliberate consensus formation, appeal to some shared standards or commitments is
indispensable (Adam 2008, pp. 249–250).
Third, what I take to be broadly shared in scientific communities is their epistemic
attitude, that is, their commitment to the gain of objective knowledge. The relevant
common ground cannot consist in common standards for judging assumptions. The only
such uncontested standards are empirical adequacy and consistency, and they are insuf-
ficient for producing consensus (as the underdetermination argument shows, see Sect. 3).
Further, appeal to epistemic values of the sort introduced (broad scope, accuracy, coher-
ence, and the like) cannot be responsible for creating unanimity because these values are
not shared to a sufficient degree. Criteria of assessment are too diverse and too variable
within the scientific community. There are contrasting commitments brought to bear within
a scientific community, and there are significant changes across historical epochs. This is
why I attribute consensus formation to a different level of values. I contend that the




epistemic attitude is codified in the form of procedural rules of the scientific community.
The epistemic attitude does not address the process of assessing hypotheses directly; it
rather concerns procedures for debating such assessments. This attitude finds its expres-
sion, in particular, in commitments like attending to dissenting views and empirical
problems, taking up criticism, and granting intellectual authority on substantive grounds
alone. Further, these rules are essentially social: they address how to deal with noncon-
formist understandings and opposing approaches. Such procedural rules for addressing
substantive diversity are suitable for constraining antagonistic beliefs and to drive them
toward a common position.9 This general approach is certainly not unheard of. Dissent in
political or legal issues is likewise sometimes resolved by appeal to procedural rules. The
claim I advance here is that the same distinction between substantive and evaluative
dissent, on the one hand, and procedural agreement works in science as well. Further, these
procedural values are social in that they are community rules, but they are also epistemic in
that following their advice is conducive to reliability or truth, that is, epistemic goals of
science.
So we need shared values, after all, but they refer to social procedures for resolving
value conflicts. This distinction between different levels brings the pluralism of epistemic
values into harmony with consensus formation and the shared epistemic commitment of
the scientific community. In order to make strife and unanimity compatible, the relevant
considerations need to be placed at different levels. Scientific research is characterized by
both skepticism and divergence, on the one hand, and by unforced assent, on the other.
Both features are in harmony because the former refer to the test and confirmation process
and the latter to the social rules guiding this process. It is only by means of an agreement of
this latter sort that research can become a collective enterprise in the first place.10 Scientific
consensus formation is possible because, regardless of divergent epistemic inclinations and
predilections in detail, scientists have a fundamental commitment in common, the com-
mitment, namely, to give heed to certain rules in debating knowledge claims. Adopting
such rules serves to curb subjective preferences for the sake of producing knowledge that
enjoys intersubjective assent.
9 That is, I try to outline the specific characteristics of epistemic aspirations. By contrast, Longino does not
recognize any in-principle difference between epistemic (or cognitive) values and social or political (or
contextual) values. On her approach, the two sets of values come out as strongly intertwined with one
another and they operate in the same way as legitimate standards of judgment (Longino 1990, pp. 185–194;
1995, pp. 383–384, 391–397; 2008, pp. 69–77). Longino is widely taken to have undermined or dissolved
the distinction between the epistemic and the social (Wilholt 2009, pp. 96–97). In addition and going beyond
Longino’s approach, there is no clear account in the literature of what precisely epistemic values amount to.
For instance, epistemic standards are characterized by their effect of conveying epistemic trust without
making clear how this feat is performed (Wilholt 2009, pp. 98–99).
10 Longino attempts to supplement pluralism with the commitment to a single set of directions that include
social rules, supposed to govern the procedure of legitimate consensus formation, and shared, publicly
recognized standards of evaluation (Longino 1990, pp. 76–78; 1993, pp. 266–268; 2002, pp. 128–131). I
agree with this twofold picture of variety and unanimity, the difficulty is, however, that the two parts of the
picture tend to be disparate and incoherent. Longino’s double commitment needs additional efforts to bring
its contrasting facets into harmony. The account I develop in this paper is intended to square the com-
mitment to pluralism with the requirement of consensus formation by placing the two at different loci in the
context of justification. We need a consensus on how to deal with dissenting claims and incongruent
standards of evaluation. Pluralism prohibits that this consensus is located at the substantive level of judging
hypotheses. By Longino’s own lights, the diversity of standards of judgment or epistemic values makes them
unfit for creating a common ground in assessing assumptions in science. This is why the present argument
entails that this common ground is mostly provided by procedural standards.
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These considerations are intended to show what the epistemic commitment of scientists
is all about and to illuminate, consequently, what is the standard which commercialized
science can fall short of. Two sorts of pertinent failures leap to the eye, namely, a violation
of communalism and of disinterestedness. As to the former, proprietary research tends to
restrict access to research findings and thereby impairs the public examination of knowl-
edge claims. Scientific results are considered as a commodity whose use is confined to
those who pay. This violation of the Mertonian norm of communalism is tantamount to an
infringement of the public, community-wide nature of confirmation practices that is part of
the conduct of science since the Scientific Revolution. By operating behind a veil of
secrecy, commercialized research revives an institutional form of erudition that is attrib-
uted to Pythagoras: science is confined to a circle of the elect few and eschews the public
eye (Carrier 2008b, pp. 219–221).
Second, disinterestedness of the scientific community frequently gives way to one-sided
judgments. In many instances, this bias takes the form of false advertising, as analyzed
before (see Sect. 7); it is thus covered by the social rule of sincerity that requires not to
deceive one’s fellow researchers. Other variants of bias are much less subtle. At times,
evidence indicating potential harm of drugs is simply ignored (Biddle 2007, pp. 27–30). In
general, clinical studies of new drugs open up a lot of design opportunities for making
them less sensitive to the kind of evidence industrial researchers would rather not want to
turn up (Adam 2008, pp. 241–243).
Accordingly, giving some substantive profile to the notion of epistemic research helps
pinpoint where application-oriented research may part ways with the former in method-
ological respect. What is worrisome about parts of application-oriented research is not the
lack of any specific epistemic virtue; many studies of this kind don’t suffer from any deficit
in this respect (see Sect. 7). The critical failure rather is how claims are processed in the
corresponding community. What is missing, at times, is the epistemic attitude.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
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